
Trilateral talks on Ukraine: what are the benefits for China?
U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration stepped up diplomatic efforts this fall to revive stalled negotiations aimed at ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Washington has increased pressure on kyiv and its European partners while seeking to bring Moscow back to the negotiating table through a series of concessions, including a deal on Russian diesel exports to the United States and a temporary easing of some sanctions.
Yet the Kremlin appears in no rush to resume meaningful peace negotiations. Moscow is ready to hold technical negotiations with Ukraine next month, the Kremlin said after the meeting between US special envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on October 21.
Putin agreed to resume peace talks mediated by Washington after November 10, his aide Yuri Ushakov said after the meeting. He added that the next round of negotiations could take place in Abu Dhabi and would focus on “building the security system for Russia and Ukraine after the end of the war.”
According to his aide, Putin also shared some thoughts with Witkoff on a possible trilateral summit involving U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ushakov stressed that Beijing is already preparing the meeting.
Trilateral summit in China without Ukraine
Moscow has proposed holding a three-way meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, scheduled for November 18-19 in Shenzhen, China, the Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week. According to WSJ sources, Putin hopes to reach an agreement with Trump and Xi on ending the war in Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia.
Moscow’s proposal for a three-way summit involving Russia, the United States and China – but excluding Ukraine and the European Union – offers a glimpse of the negotiating format the Kremlin would prefer. Russia insists Ukraine must be prepared to make territorial concessions before negotiations can move forward. Putin has also repeatedly stressed that he is only willing to negotiate if Russian interests are taken into account.
According to the WSJ, Putin views the proposed gathering in Shenzhen as a potential new Yalta Conference, referencing the 1945 meeting of the leaders of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union to discuss the defeat of Nazi Germany and the postwar order in Europe.
The newspaper reported that Chinese officials had indicated through diplomatic channels that Beijing would not object to the three-way format if Trump agreed to participate. Trump, whose relations with kyiv have deteriorated significantly in recent weeks, has also been open to such negotiations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed during his visit to Oslo on October 20 that negotiations on his country’s future would only be acceptable if Ukraine gets a seat at the negotiating table.
What does China have to gain from these negotiations?
Temur Umarov, a researcher at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin and specialized in Sino-Russian relations, is not surprised by the Kremlin’s proposal. He told DW that Moscow wants to feel respected by Washington and treated as a major international power.
The previous US administration was not willing to discuss issues affecting Ukraine’s sovereignty with Russia without kyiv’s participation. Today, Umarov said, the Kremlin believes that such negotiations may have become possible.
Moscow apparently hopes that any agreement reached at the proposed meeting would prompt the White House to pressure Ukraine and the EU to accept its terms. But what role would China really play?
Umarov believes that Beijing would participate largely as a symbolic partner rather than an active mediator responsible for the outcome. “Beijing does not intend to take responsibility for the future of Ukraine,” he said.
Merely attending the summit would not impose any additional obligations on China. “It is hardly surprising that the Kremlin insists on this format,” Umarov explained. “Russia wants to demonstrate that it is on an equal footing not only with the United States, but also with China. However, objectively speaking, Moscow is not the main partner in this relationship.”
Umarov believes that China has little direct interest in such negotiations. Even if the leaders issued a joint statement, Beijing would seek language that was as vague and evasive as possible, he said. This would allow China to present almost any further developments in the war as consistent with the agreement reached at the summit. For Umarov, such flexibility would be essential for Beijing’s participation.
However, Yurii Poita, a senior research associate at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), offers a different assessment. He believes that China and Russia have overlapping strategic interests, particularly in their efforts to promote an alternative security architecture across Eurasia.
According to him, both countries would benefit from a reduction in Western military presence in Europe and Asia and a weakening of NATO’s influence. “If Russia and China can convince the United States to reduce its military presence in Europe and its military aid to Ukraine, Russia will gain additional advantages on the battlefield,” Poita told DW.
He added that such a development would further undermine the EU’s confidence in the United States as a NATO ally. Poita believes that Moscow and Beijing would seek precisely these outcomes in any negotiations with Washington.
Is Putin’s political survival crucial for China?
Michael Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute in the United States, also doubts that Beijing is preparing to take a more active diplomatic role in ending the war.
Speaking to DW, Kimmage said China might view the conflict as destabilizing and would prefer to maintain trade relations with Ukraine and other countries in the region. But he believes another priority outweighs those concerns. “Vladimir Putin’s political survival is more important for China,” he said.
According to Kimmage, Russia offers China several geopolitical advantages, including low-cost energy and a foreign policy partner who rarely stands in Beijing’s way.
He believes that China will continue to indirectly support Russia’s military efforts to prevent a Russian defeat. A complete Russian victory may not necessarily be Beijing’s goal, he said, but it is crucial to ensure Putin does not lose. For this reason, Kimmage does not expect China to pressure the Russian president to end the war if Putin is unwilling to do so.
Does the exclusion of Europe reveal the weakness of the EU?
Neither Ukraine nor the European Union would participate in the proposed negotiations in China.
Kateryna Krasina, a junior researcher at the kyiv-based New Geopolitics Network, believes their exclusion could reveal how Beijing actually views their international influence.
According to her, China’s approach suggests that it does not view Ukraine as an independent player in the negotiations and views Europe as relatively weak.
Kimmage believes, however, that excluding Europe from the summit would not necessarily diminish its influence on the course of the negotiations.
He acknowledged that European governments might have little power to prevent a meeting between Trump, Putin and Xi. But he highlighted European efforts around the 2025 Alaska summit between Trump and Putin, which he said helped avoid outcomes that would have been unfavorable to Europe.
Kimmage said Europe’s influence has grown through financial aid to Ukraine and extensive cooperation in the defense industry, including Germany and other European countries.
He argued that European support played an important role in Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian advances. “And that support equates to leverage,” Kimmage said.
He believes that Russia, China and the United States might all want to portray Europe as a secondary power, but that such a portrayal would overlook Europe’s real influence.
“The optics and the reality are not quite the same,” he said, drawing a distinction between the appearance of great-power diplomacy resembling the Yalta Conference and Europe’s role in supporting Ukraine.
Umarov offers another perspective.
He believes that any diplomatic agreement between the United States, Russia and China would be confronted with the reality on the ground.
“China understands that whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the United States and Russia, the reality on the ground will be very different and will depend above all on Ukraine,” he said.
“Whether the Kremlin likes it or not, Ukraine has its own capacity for action. Neither the United States nor Western countries can fully determine what is happening on the battlefield through diplomatic pressure alone.”
This article was originally published in Russian.
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