
Why America can’t contain China
Two things are becoming increasingly clear. First, Jensen Huang was not forced out of his position as CEO of Nvidia because of an affair. Second, the honey trap story is a diversion. The real question now is: a diversion from what? In my opinion, the Huang affair obscures a much larger and more troubling story, one that encompasses the failure of a central element of American global strategy.
For years, Washington has relied on economic pressure – from dollar sanctions to tariffs – to keep its geopolitical rivals in line. So does the semiconductor ban: The United States has long sought to keep China in the technological dark ages by restricting the sale and use of AI chips. Not only did this strategy fail, but it had the ironic consequence of pushing Beijing to develop its own alternatives.
The key player in the Huang saga is Megaspeed, the Singapore company for which Alice Huang (no relation) worked as a senior director. Megaspeed is a cloud computing company that purchases advanced computing equipment from Nvidia, before leasing capacity to customers who operate their AI systems. In other words: the classic cloud business model.
In theory, US law restricts China’s access to AI infrastructure in third countries like Singapore. But it is downright naive to think that one can control both the dispersion of hardware and the use of virtual capabilities, when it is so easy to hide one’s identity on the Internet. After all, the most modern computing power resides in what we figuratively call the cloud. I don’t want to push the metaphor too far, but the idea that a single country could control such a virtual world is absurd. And, as Bloomberg noted, Nvidia didn’t even know where their physical chips were at any point.
So did Megaspeed play a role in chip smuggling, or did it anyway help Chinese companies access cloud services that U.S. law should have barred them from accessing? Probably – but it’s much worse than that. The leakage of knowledge needed to produce it, let alone its more advanced successor, is far greater than simply selling a high-tech product.
We know that Alice Huang was a corporate repairman. But the spread of knowledge across borders doesn’t really happen despite people like her. Far more important than Huang herself was the generation of Chinese students working on doctorates in Western science and engineering departments. In mathematics, I remember one case where an entire class of graduate students was recruited from China. This is unsurprising when UK universities rely heavily on Chinese students to stay solvent.
Since we ourselves have trained an entire generation of Chinese scientists and engineers, why are we surprised at our failure to retain them, especially when China itself now has some of the best universities on the planet? Ultimately, we cannot prohibit the export of knowledge. Just look at the atomic bomb, another technology invented in the United States, but quickly acquired by both the Soviet Union and Red China.
“Since we ourselves have trained an entire generation of Chinese scientists and engineers, why are we surprised at our failure to retain them, especially when China itself now has some of the best universities on the planet? »
It’s worth understanding how we got here with Nvidia. Under President Bush, American foreign policy was led by neoconservatives. The economic sticks were there, but they only played a secondary role. Under Barack Obama, however, America has become much more dependent on its financial arsenal. In a sense, this is not surprising. The dollar is the world’s dominant currency, meaning the United States controls all dollar transactions, even those made abroad. This allowed Washington to impose secondary sanctions on certain countries – forcing foreign banks to comply with US policy or risk being cut off from the dollar, which would have been inconceivable to most.
There were also technological arguments there. As recently as 2022, we could read that China was unable to produce chips as efficient as those of Taiwan or the Netherlands, both allies of the United States. This ultimately led Americans to believe that they could stifle Chinese technological leadership through the use of law alone. In 2018, Congress duly passed the Export Control Reform Act to strengthen the legal framework around high-tech products. A year later, the Commerce Department placed Chinese giant Huawei on the list of companies that need a special license under Washington’s export control regime. In 2020, still under the Trump administration, the United States restricted Huawei’s access to chips manufactured abroad using American technology.
But the most significant step was taken in October 2022, this time under the Biden administration, which imposed a ban on the sale of high-performance semiconductors to China. This specifically included advanced AI chips: including those produced by Nvidia, with the ban expanded to include the machines that build them.
This is how American law became extraterritorial: the most important company that knows how to manufacture these machines is ASML, based near Eindhoven. ASML is currently one of the largest technology companies in the world and, with its European supply chain of specialists in high-precision optical and mechanical engineering, has carved out a profitable niche market. But dependent on the United States for its own security through NATO, the Dutch government chose to give in to American pressure to force ASML to follow Washington’s restrictions. Soon, the Biden administration went even further, banning U.S. citizens from working for any company capable of producing high-tech machinery or even helping distribute sanctioned products to China.
It’s a policy that continued during the second Trump administration. In April last year, shortly after the president announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs, his government imposed new licensing requirements to restrict the sale of an older generation of Nvidia chips, the H20. This was a simplified processor designed specifically for the Chinese market and was previously not subject to the restrictions. After China retaliated against US tariffs by imposing tariffs of its own, as well as controlling exports, Trump lifted the ban on H20, with an arrangement where the US would receive a 15% cut of any sales. In early 2026, Trump went further by authorizing case-by-case licensing of the more powerful Nvidia H200 chip, subject to certain restrictions.
In short, under Trump II, the direction of policy has reversed. Yet it is now clear that the US strategy to strangle China has failed. Separate from Nvidia, President Xi has asked Chinese companies to buy Huawei chips rather than those made by Nvidia or AMD, its American competitor. And why not? After all, Huawei has come a long way to catch up with its American rivals. They’re not there yet, but, as with AI itself, the time lag is only a few months. With everything happening at Nvidia right now, combined with other potential disruptions that could soon hit the AI sector, I wouldn’t be surprised to see China reach tech parity by 2030.
This is the perverse effect of America’s various strategies – with the People’s Republic now ready to beat the United States at its own game. And while that’s arrogant enough, Americans have even less excuse given lessons from other industries. Take automobiles, a sector once dominated by Germany but which China has recently conquered. Ola Källenius, the chairman of Mercedes, recently said he was perplexed by his company’s declining sales in China. But why? The fact is that, thanks to better technological know-how, the Chinese are buying their own cars, just as they are making their own semiconductors.
There are broader lessons here, too, for Europeans. Our economic sanctions against Russia are failing for the same reason that U.S. microchip policy failed. The oceans are vast, the borders are porous, and the world of international trade has so many circuitous channels that only a fool would think they could plug all the loopholes. This is particularly true in the case of Russia: bordering 14 countries and having more than 20,000 kilometers of external land borders, strangling Putin’s regime through sanctions alone would never have worked.
As for the Americans, if their ill-conceived sanctions have pushed China to develop its own chip sector, a similar situation is occurring in the financial field. China and Russia have built payment systems based on the same blockchain technology as cryptocurrencies. It is therefore still early, but the great decoupling of the dollar has begun. This matters much more than who, exactly, Jensen Huang had relationships with.
Gn bussni